Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological Features by Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Turiegano, E.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and
Individual Biological Features
Citation for published version:
Sanchez-Pages, S & Turiegano, E 2013 'Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and
Individual Biological Features' Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Sanchez-Pages, S., & Turiegano, E. (2013). Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and
Individual Biological Features. Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
  
Edinburgh School of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
Number 218 
 
Two Studies on the Interplay between 
Social Preferences and Individual Biological 
Features 
 
Santiago Sánchez-Pagés 
Edinburgh University 
 
E. Turiegano 
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid 
 
Date 
2013 
 
 
 
 
Published by  
School of Economics 
University of Edinburgh 
30 ‐31 Buccleuch Place 
Edinburgh EH8 9JT 
+44 (0)131 650 8361   
http://edin.ac/16ja6A6 
 
 
 
 
  1
Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological 1 
Features 2 
 3 
Running headline: Biological features and social preferences 4 
 5 
S. SANCHEZ-PAGES1 & E. TURIEGANO2 6 
 7 
1
Department of Economic Theory, University of Barcelona, Spain, and School of 8 
Economics, University of Edinburgh, UK. 9 
 10 
2
 Departamento de Biología, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
                                                 
1
 Corresponding author. Department of Economic Theory. Avenida Diagonal 690, 08034 
Barcelona, Spain. Phone: +34 934 021 940. E-mail: sanchez.pages@ub.edu. 
 
  2
ABSTRACT 20 
Biological features and social preferences have been studied separately as factors 21 
influencing human strategic behaviour. We run two studies in order to explore the interplay 22 
between these two sets of factors. In the first study, we investigate to what extent social 23 
preferences may have some biological underpinnings. We use simple one-shot distribution 24 
experiments to attribute subjects one out of four types of social preferences: Self-interested 25 
(SI), Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). We then 26 
investigate whether these four groups display differences in their levels of facial 27 
Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA) and in proxies for exposure to testosterone during phoetal 28 
development and puberty. We observe that development-related biological features and 29 
social preferences are relatively independent. In the second study, we compare the relative 30 
weight of these two set of factors by studying how they affect subjects’ behaviour in the 31 
Ultimatum Game (UG). We find differences in offers made and rejection rates across the 32 
four social preference groups. The effect of social preferences is stronger than the effect of 33 
biological features even though the latter is significant. We also report a novel link between 34 
facial masculinity (a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty) and rejection rates 35 
in the UG. Our results suggest that biological features influence behaviour both directly and 36 
through their relation with the type of social preferences that individuals hold. 37 
 38 
Keywords: Testosterone; Ultimatum Game; Fluctuating Asymmetry; Facial masculinity; 39 
2D:4D; Social preferences. 40 
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1. Introduction 41 
 42 
In the last few years, experimental methods have been used to explore how 43 
biological features relate to individual behaviour in strategic situations. These laboratory 44 
experiments have employed a number of simple games long-studied in Experimental 45 
Economics (Smith, 1987). These games embody simplified social interactions in which the 46 
payoffs that subjects obtain depend both on their own decisions and the decisions of others. 47 
These experiments generate results which are easily measurable, quantifiable and 48 
replicable. The biological features studied in this literature include the impact of hormones 49 
and their receptors (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Burnham, 2007; Zak et al., 2007; Crockett et al., 50 
2008; Knafo et al., 2008; Zak et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 2010), genetic differences 51 
(Wallace et al., 2007; Cesarini et al., 2008), neural factors (Fehr & Rangel, 2011), and the 52 
effect of developmental instability, proxied by Fluctuating Asymmetry (Zaatari & Trivers, 53 
2007; Zaatari et al., 2009; Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010). 54 
 55 
These studies have also shed new light on the wide array of results in economic 56 
experiments showing that many individuals care strongly about the whole distribution of 57 
income and not only about their own material payoff. This class of concerns receive the 58 
name of social preferences in Economics. Social preferences have been extensively studied 59 
and include inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; 60 
Binmore & Shaked, 2010), joint welfare maximization (Charness & Rabin, 2002), and 61 
competitive preferences (Frank, 1987; Charness & Grosskopf, 2001). Social preferences 62 
have been studied extensively in Psychology under the rubric of Social Value Orientation 63 
(for reviews see Balliet, et al., 2009 and Murphy & Ackerman, 2012) 64 
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Research in Experimental Economics typically uses observed choices to uncover 65 
unobservable individual heterogeneity in social preferences. This is called the revealed 66 
preference approach. On the other hand, research in Biology uses individual heterogeneity 67 
(in physiological features, for instance) to explain observed differences in behaviour. The 68 
present paper aims at building a bridge between these two approaches. To this end, we run 69 
two studies. The first one explores the extent to which individual biological features and 70 
social preferences are independent of each other. The second study explores, within the 71 
same population, the relative importance of these two sets of variables in strategic 72 
interactions by relating them to behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (UG henceforth). 73 
 74 
Study 1 75 
In the first step of this study, we use a set of one-shot distribution experiments to 76 
classify subjects into one of the main four types of social preferences described in the 77 
Experimental Economics literature (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004): Self-interested (SI), 78 
Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). These four types of 79 
social preferences translate into different behaviours in economic interactions. SI subjects 80 
are mainly interested in maximizing their own payoff. The ES subjects are interested in 81 
maximizing the total benefits obtained by all participants, even at their own expense. IA 82 
subjects are interested in minimizing the disparity in the distribution of income 83 
independently of whether this disparity is in their favour or not. Finally, C subjects are 84 
interested in minimizing unfavourable inequality and in maximizing favourable inequality, 85 
even at the expense of some material payoff. 86 
 87 
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Once classified, we study whether subjects who hold different social preferences 88 
display differences in several biological features. The biological features which we consider 89 
here are facial Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA, henceforth), and two proxies for testosterone 90 
exposure in utero and during puberty, the second to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) and facial 91 
masculinity, respectively. We have chosen these variables because they have showed to 92 
influence a number of behaviours (e.g. tendency to cooperate, competitiveness), which are 93 
affected by social preferences as well. Their impact on adult behaviour operates through 94 
their effect on nervous system development (Bates, 2007; Berenbaum & Beltz 2011). 95 
 96 
FA refers to minor non-directional deviations from bilateral symmetry (Palmer & 97 
Strobeck, 1986). It is considered to be the result of developmental instability. Many studies 98 
show a link between symmetry and individual fitness, both in non-humans (Møller, 1997; 99 
Møller, 2006), and in humans (Van Dongen & Gangestad, 2011). Facial symmetry has been 100 
proposed as a cue of heritable fitness benefits (Scheib et al., 1999; Little & Jones, 2006). 101 
Regarding human behaviour, low FA is linked to individuals who are more self-confident, 102 
prone to behave aggressively (Furlow et al., 1998; Manning & Wood, 1998; Benderlioglu 103 
et al., 2004) and less cooperatively (Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010). 104 
 105 
Testosterone (T) is a steroid hormone which promotes behaviours aimed at 106 
increasing reproductive success in males, such as risk-taking (Mazur & Booth, 1998) 107 
aggression (Archer, 2006), sensation-seeking (Roberti, 2004) and interest in sex (Rupp & 108 
Wallen, 2007). T levels have been described to correlate with general fitness, reproductive 109 
success and status (Mazur & Booth, 1998; Bribiescas, 2001; Zitzmann & Nieschlag, 2001; 110 
Muehlenbein & Bribiescas, 2005). In addition, T exerts organizational effects on the brain 111 
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during phoetal sexual differentiation (Morris et al., 2004), and during puberty (Sisk et al., 112 
2003). Exposure to T in these critical periods is considered to have an effect on brain 113 
structures and, therefore, on adult male behaviour (Berenbaum & Beltz 2011). We use 114 
2D:4D and facial masculinity as proxies for the level of exposure to the hormone in these 115 
two developmental stages. Evidence indicates that 2D:4D negatively correlates with 116 
prenatal testosterone (Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Zheng & Cohn, 2011). Low 2D:4D subjects 117 
are also less likely to behave altruistically (Millet & Dewitte, 2006; Sanchez-Pages & 118 
Turiegano, 2010). But, as 2D:4D is related to dispositional dominance, low ratios associate 119 
as well with pro-social behaviour in certain contexts (Millet, 2011). On the other hand, 120 
many masculine facial features develop during puberty under the action of testosterone 121 
(Enlow, 1996). Facial masculinity has been shown to affect human male behaviour 122 
(Apicella et al., 2008; Pound et al., 2009). Finally, given that some authors have linked 123 
facial masculinity to male attractiveness (Johnston, 2006; Rhodes, 2006), we conjecture 124 
that facially masculine men might behave similarly to attractive men (Takahashi et al., 125 
2006; Wilson & Eckel, 2006). 126 
 127 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has investigated the link between 128 
the social preferences considered in Economics and the biological features considered in 129 
the present work (but see Yamagishi et al., 2012). Hence, our conjectures on the existence 130 
of differences in biological features across social preference groups or on the direction of 131 
these differences (if any) cannot be strongly substantiated by previous results. Still, related 132 
evidence suggests that subjects less interested in their relative position in the income 133 
distribution (SI and ES) should show lower levels of facial masculinity given the relation 134 
described between testosterone and status-seeking behaviour (Mazur & Booth, 1998; 135 
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Josephs et al., 2006). We predict a similar pattern for 2D:4D (Millet & Dewitte, 2006) 136 
although we expect IA subjects, who are the most interested in implementing an egalitarian 137 
distribution of income, to show the lowest levels (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006; Millet 138 
& Dewitte, 2009). Regarding FA, individuals less interested in joint welfare (SI and C) are 139 
expected to display lower levels of FA since more symmetric individuals are less interested 140 
in cooperation given that they need less support from their peers (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007; 141 
Sanchez- Pages & Turiegano, 2010). This difference in FA is expected to be greatest 142 
between SI an ES subjects, as SI subjects do not care about the outcome received by others 143 
whereas ES subjects care mostly about joint welfare.  144 
 145 
Study 2 146 
In the second study, we compare the relative importance of individual biological 147 
features and social preferences in strategic interactions by looking at subjects’ behaviour in 148 
the UG. In this experiment, two players have to divide a sum of money. The first player 149 
proposes how to divide the sum between the two players. The second player can either 150 
accept or reject this proposal. A rejection implies that both players receive nothing. 151 
Acceptance implies that the money is split according to the proposal. This game is well 152 
suited for our purposes because of two reasons. First, it is well-known that behaviour in the 153 
UG departs substantially from the standard economic prediction of own income 154 
maximization. Pure self-interest dictates that responders should accept any positive offer 155 
and that proposers should make the lowest possible offer. However, low offers are often 156 
rejected and the vast majority of offers range between 30% and 50% of the sum to be 157 
distributed (Roth, 1995). The second reason is that the UG has been widely employed in the 158 
study of the effects of hormones on behaviour (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Burnham, 2007; Zak et 159 
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al., 2007; Crockett et al., 2008; Zak et al., 2009; Zethraeus et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 160 
2010), and of development-related variables, like FA (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007; Zaatari et 161 
al., 2009) and 2D:4D (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006). 162 
 163 
In the role of responders, we expect SI and ES subjects to accept lower offers than 164 
the rest of participants; the SI group because they prefer any positive amount of money to 165 
nothing, and the latter because rejection entails the loss of the whole amount to be 166 
distributed. On the other hand, C subjects should reject low offers more often because 167 
acceptance would leave them significantly worse off than the proposer. IA subjects should 168 
reject low offers too in order to avoid a high disparity in the earnings of the two 169 
participants. In the role of proposers, we expect IA and ES subjects to make higher offers 170 
than the rest, given that IA agents care strongly about equality and that ES subjects can 171 
reduce the risk of rejection (that would lead to the whole sum being wasted) by doing so. 172 
This leads us to expect that the offers made by SI and C subjects should be lower in average 173 
than those made by IA and ES.  174 
 175 
In addition to the relationships already described in the literature between biological 176 
features and behaviour in the UG, (Van der Bergh & Dewitte, 2006; Zaatari & Trivers, 177 
2007), we also expect participants who reject low offers to show higher facial masculinity. 178 
We base this prediction on 1) the link between masculine features and self-sufficiency 179 
(Muehlenbein & Bribiescas, 2005), and 2) the higher rejection rates of unfair splits 180 
displayed by males with higher testosterone levels (Burnham, 2007), and 3) the known 181 
effect of facial attractiveness, which partially relates to masculinity, on reciprocity (Wilson 182 
& Eckel, 2006). Finally, in the role of proposers, we expect participants exposed to low 183 
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levels of testosterone during development (with higher 2D:4D or lower facial masculinity) 184 
to make higher offers. This hypothesis is based on the interpretation of fairness in the UG 185 
as an expression of cooperation (Page et al., 2000) and on the relationship between 186 
cooperation and exposure to testosterone during development (Millet & Dewitte, 2006; 187 
Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010).  188 
 189 
2. Methods 190 
 191 
Preliminaries 192 
 The two studies we report here were performed successively in Madrid in the winter 193 
of 2009. A total of 152 self-declared white male subjects participated, distributed in 10 194 
morning sessions with less than 20 subjects each. Participants were recruited by e-mail. All 195 
of them filled a short questionnaire asking their age, discipline of study, ethnicity and 196 
sexual orientation. Subjects were students at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), 197 
mostly from the School of Biological Sciences. Ages varied from 17 to 30, 20.34±0.17yr; 198 
av±SEM). Participants gave their written consent to the use of their data. The experiment 199 
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the UAM. 200 
 201 
 Subjects were seated at partitioned computer terminals to ensure they could not 202 
interact with each other. All subjects were carefully instructed about the rules of the 203 
experiment. The experiment was conducted via computers employing the z-Tree 3.2.10 204 
software for Economics Experiments (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were informed that 205 
their payment could reach around 9€ and it was going to depend on some of the choices 206 
they were about to make, although they did not know which ones specifically. Hence, all 207 
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decisions mattered for participants. Actual payments were computed based on all their 208 
decisions except for their choice as proposers in the UG. We informed subjects of this 209 
payment method a few weeks after the experimental sessions finished in order to avoid 210 
information spreading. Payoffs during the experiment were expressed in points, and 211 
participants knew that the exchange rate was 100p=2€. At the end of each session, subjects 212 
were paid privately in cash. The average amount paid was 8.43±0.43€ (av±SD), including a 213 
show-up fee (5€). The experimental sessions took about 30 minutes. No female was present 214 
during the sessions nor the process of data collection in order to avoid any moderating 215 
effects of sexual cues on participants’ behaviour (Van der Bergh & Dewitte, 2006). 216 
 217 
Measurement of individual biological features 218 
Photographs of the participants and scans of their hands were taken before each 219 
session. We took high-resolution full frontal facial colour photographs of all participants 220 
with an Olympus E-500 digital camera. The photos were taken in homogeneous conditions 221 
(soft light, fixed distance of the camera, completely opened zoom to avoid any optical 222 
distortion). Participants were asked to remove any facial adornment and to pose with a 223 
neutral expression. We tried to minimize any distortion caused by the rotation of the head 224 
by asking subjects to look directly into the camera, and by correcting their position if 225 
necessary (instead of using a more osteological standardization, such as the Frankfort 226 
Horizontal). We took three images of each participant. 227 
 228 
The shape of each face was defined by manually setting 39 landmarks (LM) which 229 
can be unambiguously identified in every photo (Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010) by 230 
using the TPS morphometric free software (by F.J. Rohlf, see 231 
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http://life.bio.sunysb.edu/morph/). We employed these LMs to calculate facial masculinity 232 
and FA using the Morpho-J free software (by C. P. Klingenberg. See 233 
http://www.ﬂywings.org.uk/MorphoJ_page.htm). The LMs were placed twice, once for 234 
each researcher, allowing the software to quantify digitizing error through Procrustes 235 
ANOVA analysis (Klingenberg & McIntyre 1998; Klingenberg et al. 2002). 236 
 237 
Individual FA was calculated employing a Procrustes ANOVA analysis 238 
(Klingenberg & McIntyre 1998; Klingenberg et al. 2002). We placed LMs in two photos of 239 
each subject in order to control for any error in the photo taking process. We thus 240 
quantified two measurement errors, in photo taking and the digitizing error. There was a 241 
significant directional asymmetry in the sample, that is, the mean asymmetry was 242 
significantly different from zero (the main effect of mirroring is significant in the 243 
Procrustes ANOVA; F=4.34 df=37 p<0.001). Individual FA scores correspond to the 244 
Procrustes distance between the original and mirrored copies of the landmark configuration 245 
of each individual after correcting for directional asymmetry (Klingenberg & McIntyre, 246 
1998; Schaefer et al., 2006). 247 
 248 
Facial masculinity was measured by calculating the Procrustes distance between the 249 
LM configuration of each male average image and a reference female face (Sanchez-Pages 250 
& Turiegano, 2010). The reference female face was obtained by averaging 50 images of 251 
white self-reported female students and their mirror images. Each male average face was 252 
obtained from two photos of each participant and their mirror images. We employed this 253 
protocol in order to avoid any perturbation in this measurement caused by the asymmetry of 254 
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males faces compared to the female reference face. An advantage of this method is its 255 
independence from age and ethnic differences (given the appropriate reference group). 256 
   257 
Participants' right hands were scanned with a CanoScan LiDE70 high-resolution 258 
scanner. The second and fourth digits were measured from the centre of the flexion crease 259 
proximal to the palm to the top of the digit. This is a commonly accepted method to 260 
calculate 2D:4D (Fink et al., 2005; Millet & Dewitte, 2006; Apicella et al., 2008). The 261 
fingers were measured twice (once by each author) employing the appropriate utility of the 262 
TPS morphometric free software. Both measures highly correlated (r = 0.985, p < 0.001 263 
and N = 152). The variable employed in the analyses was the average of both measures.  264 
 265 
Study 1  266 
 In the first study, we measured social preferences with a sequence of two-choice 267 
questions presented to subjects, our Social Preferences Test (SPT). Answering to a 268 
sequence of questions is a method commonly employed when measuring social preferences 269 
(Van Lange et al., 1997).The choices in the SPT were two distributions of points between 270 
the subject and a counterpart. Subjects were told that this counterpart was a participant in 271 
future experimental sessions. In the first pair of choices, subjects had to choose between 272 
distribution A= {20, 30} and distribution B= {30, 80}, where the first figure indicates the 273 
number of points allocated to the subject making the choice. These distributions displayed 274 
inequality unfavourable to the subject. In the second pair of distributions, the inequality 275 
was favourable to the subject, who was asked to choose between distribution C= {70, 10} 276 
and D= {60, 50}. These two pairs of distributions are such that the four possible different 277 
profiles of choices correspond to four different types of social preferences. The choice {B, 278 
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C} corresponds to SI subjects, that is, those mostly interested in maximizing the amount of 279 
points they receive. The choice {B, D} corresponds to ES subjects, that is, those interested 280 
in maximizing the total sum of points. The choice {A, D} corresponds to IA subjects 281 
because those choices yield the most egalitarian distribution of points within each pair. 282 
Finally, we attribute the remaining choice to C subjects, that is, those interested in 283 
minimizing unfavourable inequality and in maximizing favourable inequality, even at the 284 
expense of some material payoff. 285 
 286 
Our SPT was designed along the same lines as the well-established Triple-287 
Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientation (SVO) (Van Lange et al., 1997). This 288 
measure presents subjects with nine questions, each containing three distributions of 289 
income. Each of these three items corresponds to a primary SVO: prosocial, individualistic 290 
and competitive. A subject who picks six or more items corresponding to one of these 291 
SVOs is classified as such. Hence, the Triple-Dominance measure of SVO may leave 292 
unclassified a non-negligible fraction of subjects (Eek & Gärling, 2006). We designed our 293 
SPT in order to classify all participants. This efficiency property (Murphy et al., 2011) is 294 
important, especially when subjects are paid for their choices. More importantly, the SPT 295 
permits a finer classification of subjects: the Triple-Dominance Measure of SVO contains 296 
no item in which the subject experiences unfavourable inequality, and therefore it cannot 297 
distinguish between IA and ES subjects, classifying both of them as prosocial. In addition, 298 
the SPT is simple and provides clear economic incentives. Still, given that the SPT is based 299 
on a small number of questions, we checked its validity by comparing it to the Triple-300 
Dominance Measure of SVO.  301 
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We ran this robustness study at UAM in the fall of 2011 and 2012. A total of 106 302 
self-declared white males subjects (age 20.85±0.19yr) were presented with the nine items 303 
of the Triple-Dominance Measure of SVO and the two choices of our SPT. Subjects were 304 
informed that they would be paid for the eleven options they chose. Results of this study 305 
showed a high degree of consistency between the Triple-Dominance Measure of SVO and 306 
the SPT. The SPT produced a classification which coincided with the SVO measure for 307 
90.4% of the subjects that the SVO test classified (12 out of the 106 subjects were left 308 
unclassified by the SVO). Let us reiterate that subjects classified as either IA or ES in the 309 
SPT are classified as prosocial in the Triple-Dominance Measure of SVO. In February 310 
2013, we checked the reliability of our SPT by asking these participants to answer again the 311 
SPT through e-mail (but without a payment). We recruited 79 of the initial 106 participants. 312 
Of these participants, 84.8% (n=67) did not change of SPT group. The more stable group 313 
was SI (94.4% of the initial SI maintained this classification). The most frequent change in 314 
group was between IA and EM (3 of the 13 initial IA became classified as EM). 315 
 316 
Study 2 317 
 In the second study, participants took part in four one-shot UGs. Participants were 318 
asked to make choices in both roles, as responders and as proposers. In order to avoid 319 
competitive effects within each group of participants, subjects were playing each time 320 
against a participant not present in the room. As proposers, subjects could offer any integer 321 
amount of points between 0 and 100p to a future participant. As responders, they played 322 
three times; they were told that they were playing against three previous participants. Each 323 
time they had to accept or reject a different offer: a low offer (15p), an intermediate offer 324 
(30p) and a high offer (50p). The order of these three offers was randomly chosen in each 325 
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session. Given that subjects had to make an offer to a future participant as proposers, it was 326 
natural for them to receive offers from previous participants in the role of responders. We 327 
chose this design over asking subjects for their minimal acceptable offer because that 328 
design makes less clear for subjects how choices determine payments. The high offer (50p) 329 
served as a control to ensure that subjects understood the experiment. All subjects accepted 330 
that offer, so we will not include it in any further analysis.  331 
 332 
Statistical analyses 333 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the morphological variables we employ. We 334 
tested the normality of these variables with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Masculinity and 335 
2D:4D are normally distributed. We log transformed FA after multiplying the measure by 336 
100 (in order to avoid negative values which could complicate the interpretation of its 337 
effects). Offer was resistant to any transformation into normality, so when performing any 338 
analysis with this variable we used non-parametric methods. To analyze the results we 339 
employed ANOVA and student-t test for differences in normally distributed variables, 340 
Kruskal-Wallis H for non-normally distributed variables (i.e., Offer) and chi square test 341 
when comparing nominal variables. When analyzing correlation between variables, we 342 
used the non-parametric Spearman ρ. We also employed logistic regressions to analyze 343 
simultaneously the effect of several independent variables on our dichotomous dependent 344 
variables (acceptance or rejection of the low and medium offers). These analyses were 345 
made following the recommendations in Kleinbaum & Klein (2002). First, the effects of 346 
individual variables were analyzed independently. New variables were subsequently added 347 
to these models. We do not report results on interactions between variables because they 348 
were not significant. We employed SPSS15 in all our statistical analysis.  349 
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3. Results 350 
 351 
Study 1 352 
In the first study, we classified the 152 subjects according to their answers in the 353 
SPT. The most common social preference group among our participants was SI (51.32%, 354 
n=78), followed by C (23.03%, n=35), ES (20.39%, n=31), and finally IA (5.26%, n=8). 355 
There were statistically significant differences (Chi square test, χ23=9.208, p=0.027) 356 
between subjects who were studying Economics (n=55) and those who were studying 357 
Biology (n=81); the former type of students displayed a higher proportion of SI subjects 358 
(SI=61.8%; ES=21.8%; C=16.4%; IA=0%) whereas the latter displayed a higher proportion 359 
of C subjects (SI=44.4%; ES=18.5%; C=27.2%; IA=9.9%). 360 
  361 
Next we analyzed how biological features varied across these groups (Figure 1). We 362 
found no significant differences in 2D:4D (ANOVA, F148, 3 =0.746, p=0.527) nor in facial 363 
masculinity (F148, 3 =0.579, p=0.630). We also found that, as we initially conjectured, SI 364 
subjects show lower levels of FA than ES subjects (t test, t107=2.043, p=0.043). Differences 365 
are not significant across all four groups (F148, 3 =2.056, p=0.109), although they follow the 366 
predicted pattern (see Figure 1).  367 
 368 
Study 2 369 
In the role of proposers, the average offer made across all subjects was 44.84 points. 370 
We found significant differences in the average offer across groups (Kruskal-Wallis test, 371 
H3=9.598, p=0.022). Figure 1.C shows that SI and C subjects make lower offers on average 372 
than the ES and IA subjects as predicted. Neither 2D:4D (Spearman correlation coefficient, 373 
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ρ152=0.031, p=0.702), facial masculinity (ρ152=-0.032, p=0.692) nor FA (ρ152=-0.065, 374 
p=0.430) show a significant correlation with the offer for the entire subject pool.  375 
 376 
Regarding their behaviour as responders, 31.57% of subjects rejected the medium 377 
offer whereas 58.55% rejected the low offer. There were significant differences in rejection 378 
rates across the SPT groups, both for the medium (Chi square test, χ23=11.261, p=0.010) 379 
and the low offer (χ23=9.944, p=0.019). Figure 1 shows that, as expected, SI and ES agents 380 
accept both offers more often, whereas C subjects reject them more frequently.  381 
 382 
As the first step in the simultaneous analysis of the importance of biological features 383 
and social preferences, we analyzed the effect of the former set of factors on responders’ 384 
behaviour (see Table 2 for p-values and statistics). Participants who rejected the low offer 385 
had higher facial masculinity than those who accepted it. We found no differences in FA 386 
between subjects who accepted or rejected the low offer, in line with previous results in the 387 
literature (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007). We found no significant differences in 2D:4D either, 388 
although average digit ratios followed the pattern (lower ratios in participants who rejected 389 
the offer) previously reported in the literature (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006). We 390 
performed the same analysis for the medium offer and we found identical patterns for the 391 
three variables, although none of the differences were statistically significant (“medium 392 
offer” row in Table 2).  393 
 394 
Finally, we evaluated simultaneously the effect of all variables on acceptance rates 395 
by running a logit regression analysis (Table 3). The analysis of the low offer showed a 396 
significant effect of the SPT classification in the same direction as in the results described 397 
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above. Facial masculinity had a negative impact on the acceptance rate of the low offer. 398 
The logit analysis of the medium offer yielded that the SPT classification had a significant 399 
impact on acceptance rates, whereas no biological variable was found to have a significant 400 
effect (lower half of Table 3).  401 
 402 
4. Discussion  403 
 404 
Inequality aversion and efficiency concerns on the one hand (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 405 
Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), and exposure to hormones and 406 
proxies for developmental instability on the other (Kosfeld, et al., 2005; Van den Bergh & 407 
Dewitte, 2006; Burnham, 2007; Zaatari & Trivers, 2007; Zak et al., 2007; Apicella et al., 408 
2008; Crockett et al., 2008; ; Zak et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 2010), can explain why the 409 
behaviour observed in economic experiments departs from the predictions of standard 410 
economic theory. In this paper, we offer a systematic attempt at linking social preferences, 411 
individual biological features and strategic behaviour. 412 
 413 
In a first study, we found that these two sets of explanations are related only to some 414 
extent. Two different social preference groups, SI and ES, which account for 71.71% of the 415 
subject pool, displayed differences in FA, a biological feature that has been shown to affect 416 
behaviour in economic games. No significant differences were found in facial masculinity 417 
or 2D:4D across social preference groups. The link between social preferences and 418 
individual biological differences would thus seem of relatively low importance, at least 419 
under our measure of social preferences. We measured social preferences by means of the 420 
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SPT, a set of one-shot distribution experiments whose results are highly consistent with the 421 
widely-used Triple- Dominance Measure of SVO (Van Lange et al., 1997). This measure is 422 
also highly reliable. The STP is more efficient than the Triple- Dominance Measure of 423 
SVO since it classifies all subjects, and it is also finer since it can single out inequality 424 
averse subjects. Both the SPT and SVO are designed to shut down strategic concerns such 425 
as reciprocity that could potentially confound with purely distributional concerns. However, 426 
none of these two measures can rule out that subjects may have reputation-management 427 
concerns when making one-shot distributional choices (Trivers, 2004). Another weakness 428 
of both measures is their limited statistical power resulting from their use of a categorical 429 
classification instead of a continuous one. We cannot rule out that the SPT does not have 430 
the statistical power required to detect subtle but yet important biological effects.  In our 431 
future research, we plan to investigate further this issue by using the Slider Measure 432 
developed by Murphy et al. (2011) given its higher statistical power. 433 
 434 
In the second study, we looked at the effect of social preferences (measured by the 435 
SPT) and individual biological features in behaviour in the UG. The four SPT groups 436 
behaved differently in both roles, as we had predicted (see Figure 1B, C). As a matter of 437 
fact, social preferences measured with the SPT seem to have a stronger effect on behaviour 438 
than the biological features studied here. When we include both the SPT classification and 439 
the set of physiologically-based variables in the analysis of acceptance rates (see Table 3), 440 
the former is always significant, whereas the latter is significant only for the low offer. This 441 
suggests that the importance of biological features might be crowded out by financial 442 
incentives. In the role of proposers, there are differences in the amount offered by the four 443 
groups, but there is no correlation between the offer made and any biological feature we 444 
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considered. These results suggest that social considerations have an effect at least as strong 445 
as biological features (Eisenegger et al., 2010; Salvador, 2005). This conclusion, however, 446 
can apply to neutral contexts only. Previous studies have shown that modest situational 447 
cues can alter the relationship between biological features and the behaviour of males in the 448 
UG (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006). This is consistent with results showing that 449 
behaviour in the UG rests on a balance between phylogenetically older structures, involved 450 
in automatic reactive emotional responses (amygdala), and the neocortical areas, which 451 
have a richer future representation (frontal cortex and insula) (Gospic et al., 2011). While 452 
biological characteristics are important in the emotional response to a challenge, they are 453 
less important in the evaluation of long-term consequences. The presence of situational 454 
cues inducing stronger emotional responses (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006; Millet & 455 
Dewitte, 2009) might enhance the influence of biological features on strategic behaviour. 456 
 457 
But the effect of social preferences and biological features cannot be completely 458 
decoupled. Biological features have an effect on behaviour through social preferences. We 459 
obtained that SI and ES subjects have different levels of FA and also make different offers 460 
in the UG. This suggests that the positive link between FA and offers in the UG observed in 461 
Zaatari & Trivers (2007) could be attributed to two specific subsets of the population, one 462 
interested in maximizing efficiency and another purely self-interested. Probably, this 463 
correlation between FA and the offer in the UG for just a part of the subject pool rather than 464 
for the entire sample constitutes our major departure from the previous literature. However, 465 
there are three important differences between Zaatari & Trivers (2007) and our work that 466 
make comparisons difficult. First, the vast majority of their subjects were teenagers (mean 467 
age= 15.93 years; S.D.=1.67; mode=15; range=13–20) while ours were young adults (our 468 
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subjects ages varied from 17 to 30, with a mean of 20.34±0.17 years and a mode of 20). 469 
This is an important difference that is even more relevant at the light of 1) the described 470 
effects of T on behaviour in the UG (Burnham, 2007) and 2) that teenagers suffer rapid 471 
changes in T levels (Buchanan et al., 1992; Sisk & Zehr, 2005). Another main difference is 472 
that these authors measured asymmetry in several body characteristics, and attributed them 473 
entirely to FA. In our analysis, we measured FA separating it from any possible directional 474 
asymmetry (Schaefer et al., 2006). Third, these authors obtained the result linking low FA 475 
to low offers after a statistical correction of the so-called background variables (age, sex, 476 
body mass index and friendliness scores). We did not control for these measures (except for 477 
age) and this adds another source of non-comparability. 478 
 479 
The present paper also shows the influence of facial masculinity on behaviour. 480 
Facial masculinity is a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty (Enlow, 1996). 481 
This variable is an objective measure, in contrast with often-used measures of masculinity 482 
based on subjective scores. Objective measures of facial masculinity have been rarely used 483 
in behavioural research (Apicella et al., 2008; Carré & McCormick, 2008; Pound et al., 484 
2009) and, with the exception of Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano (2010), they have not been 485 
used to study strategic behaviour. The immuncompetence handicap hypothesis states that 486 
masculine traits signal inmunnocompetence and developmental stability (Folstad & Karter, 487 
1992). In this line, perceived facial masculinity correlates both with health (Rhodes et al., 488 
2003) and strength (Fink et al., 2007) in young males. Therefore, men with more masculine 489 
faces seem to be more capable of resisting physiological stress and, to some extent, could 490 
be said to show higher phenotypic quality. 491 
 492 
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Our results for the UG seem plausible if one considers the game, as some authors do 493 
(Page et al., 2000), as an approximation to the problem of dividing the expected catch in 494 
hunting, where rejection means a refusal to cooperate. Given that males seem to adopt 495 
different behavioural strategies depending on their phenotypic quality (Zaatari & Trivers, 496 
2007; Apicella et al., 2008), more masculine males might not need to be as cooperative as 497 
less masculine males because their greater ability to gain access to resources. This 498 
hypothesis has also been proposed as an explanation of why more facially masculine males 499 
tend to take more risks (Apicella et al., 2008) and why they show increases in circulating 500 
testosterone after a success (Pound et al., 2009). Alternatively, as less masculine males are 501 
less attractive to females (Johnston, 2006), their behaviour tends to be more cooperative in 502 
order to signal their willingness to deliver high paternal investment and, therefore, their 503 
interest in long-term relationships (Takahashi et al., 2006). 504 
 505 
The present paper aimed to integrate the different approaches used in Economics on 506 
the one side and Physiology on the other. Economic behaviour is based on the concept of 507 
preferences, which are revealed through individual choices. In Biology, some fundamental 508 
individual characteristics, like hormone levels (during development and in adults), have 509 
been described to have an impact on behaviour. Our two studies were designed to combine 510 
these two approaches and also to evaluate their relative importance. Clearly, the interplay 511 
between these two sets of explanations is a very complex issue that deserves further tests 512 
and analyses.  513 
 514 
 515 
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Figure Legends 781 
 782 
Figure 1  783 
Differences across behavioural types 784 
A) Differences in the individual features studied.  785 
B) Differences in the rejection rates for the low and medium offers 786 
C) Differences in the offers made.  787 
FA was transformed into Ln(100xFA). Different statistical test were applied depending on 788 
the characteristics of the variables studied (t test, χ
2 
test and Kruskal-Wallis H test 789 
respectively). * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01. 790 
791 
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Table 1: Summary statistics. 792 
 793 
 
Average SD Max Min 
Facial masculinity
 
 0.089 0.022 0.154 0.042 
Fluctuating Asymmetry
 
 0.035 0.014 0.084 0.016 
2D:4D finger ratio
 
 0.962 0.030 1.049 0.897 
N 152 152 152 152 
 794 
795 
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Table 2:  796 
Average individual features according to participants’ response to the two offers. 797 
  n 
Fluctuating 
Asymmetry
  
Ln(100 x FA) 
Facial masculinity
 
 2D:4D finger ratio
 
 
Low offer Reject 89 0.036±0.014 0.093±0.022 0.960±0.030 
 Accept 63 0.034±0.014 0.084±0.022 0.964±0.030 
   t150=1.183 p=0.239 t150=2.453 p=0.015 t150=-0.792 p=0.430 
      
Medium offer Reject 48 0.036±0.015 0.092±0.022 0.958±0.029 
 Accept 104 0.035±0.014 0.088±0.022 0.964±0.031 
   t150=0.232 p=0.817
 
 t150=0.895 p=0.372 t150=-1.155 p=0.250 
 798 
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Table 3: 800 
Logistic models for the rejection rates in the low and medium offers.  801 
 802 
Offer 
MODEL VARIABLE 
-2LL 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
df p variables coef Wald df P 
Low  189.589 16.659 6 0.011 
Constant -3.039 0.283 1 0.595 
2D:4D 5.310 0.817 1 0.366 
Masculinity -17.409 4.425 1 0.035 
FA -0.380 0.588 1 0.443 
SP  8.256 3 0.041 
 ES -0.548 1.481 1 0.224 
 C -1.277 7.270 1 0.007 
 IA -1.077 1.560 1 0.212 
Medium  177.137 12.454 6 0.053 
Constant -5.169 0.718 1 0.397 
2D:4D 6.966 1.238 1 0.266 
Masculinity -5.248 0.410 1 0.522 
FA 0.081 0.026 1 0.872 
SP  10.064 3 0.018 
 ES 0.030 0.003 1 0.953 
 C -1.084 6.183 1 0.013 
 IA -1.647 4.355 1 0.037 
 803 
 804 
Logistic regressions for the low and medium offers. The models reported include the 805 
variables 2D:4D, fluctuating asymmetry (FA), facial masculinity (Masculinity) and social 806 
preferences (SP). The latter variable has four possible categories: Efficiency Seeker (ES), 807 
Competitive (C), Inequality Averse (IA) and Self Interested (the reference group). A series 808 
of models were run by including one additional variable at a time. We report only the last 809 
of these models.  810 
 811 
